Publications

Incentives for accurate energy predictions: How to reduce epistemic uncertainty

tl;dr
How do you address the uncertainty you do not know? Epistemic uncertainty is the uncertainty that is not modelled. This work provides a mechanism that incentivizes people to provide better uncertainty models.

Venue: 15th ACM International Conference on Future and Sustainable Energy Systems (e-Energy)
Authors: Roland Saur, Han La Poutré, and Neil Yorke-Smith.

 

Fair pricing for time-flexible smart energy markets

tl;dr
Fairness is complicate when systems become flexible. Definitions like “the same price for the same item” become fuzzy, when flexibility allows you to shuffle around who sells to whom at no cost to optimality. This work defines fairness in mathematical terms for flexible systems as “the same price over equivalent outcomes”.

Venue: 2023 International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)
Authors: Roland Saur, Han La Poutré, and Neil Yorke-Smith.

 

Towards optimal demand-side bidding in parallel auctions for time-shiftable electrical loads

tl;dr
What happens to your electricity bidding strategy, when you have access to a free energy dump? Turns out simply being able to shed excess energy, shifts your optimal bidding strategy towards bidding more aggressively across a larger time range.

Venue: 2020 IEEE 18th International Conference on Industrial Informatics (INDIN)
Authors: Roland Saur, Han La Poutré, and Neil Yorke-Smith.

 

Combined heat and power markets by double-sided auction mechanisms

tl;dr
In market design, there are things that are impossible. A two-sided market cannot break-even while finding the optimal solution and incentivizing people to participate honestly. This work explores trade-reduction as a possible compromise: sacrificing a small amount of optimality to ensure honesty and sustainability.

Venue: 2019 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe (ISGT-Europe)
Authors: Roland Saur, Neil Yorke-Smith, and Han La Poutré.

 

Others